Raiden Monitoring Service


  • Monitoring Service (MS) listens to blinded Balance Proofs (BP) and proposed service fees in a public Matrix Room
  • Any pre-registered MS can decide to monitor a channel and store corresponding BPs
  • Then, whenever a channel is closed by calling closeChannel and after a period of x blocks where the client is expected the react, the MS will call updateNonClosingBalanceProof with the submitted BP by its client
  • Service fees are paid in RDN, there is no free tier
  • In the short term we go for a simple design which will allow us to reach the Ithaca milestone earlier
  • In the long-term we see the PISA approach as more economically viable and user friendly, but this design requires additional features and can be developed independently after Ithaca

Usual Scenario

The Raiden node that belongs to Alice is going offline and Alice wants to be protected against having her channels closed by Bob with an incorrect balance proof.

  1. Whenever Alice wants to get her channel monitored, Alice publishes her Monitor Request - including a blinded balance proofs - into a public chat room
  2. Updates can be sent by Alice whenever the state or proposed fee changes
  3. MSs can pick up these messages and then listen to ChannelClosed events regarding this particular channel
  4. If so, whenever the channel is closed and before the settlement period has ended, the MS will call the updateNonClosingBalanceProof function with the provided information, after a period of x blocks where the client is expected to react. This way the settleChannel function that calculates the token distribution can only be executed submitting the corresponding balance values of the hashed balances provided before
  5. Either Alice or Bob (or anyone else) can now anytime call settleChannel and initiate the token distribution
  6. After a successful submission of the hashed balance by the MS calling updateNonClosingBalanceProof (might be a defeat of an attack), the monitoring service gets an on-chain payment from a smart contract where Alice deposited some tokens beforehand
  7. This will result in a correct distribution of tokens, in accordance with the off-chain transfers

Information Flow

Monitoring Service - Flow Chart

General Requirements for the Design of the Monitoring Service

  • Sybil Attack resistance (i.e. no one should be able to announce an unlimited number of possibly faulty services)
  • Some degree of redundancy (ability to register a balance proof with multiple competing monitoring services)

Design of the Monitoring Service (still work in progress)

Monitoring Service Registration

The Monitoring Service has to be registered in the ServiceRegistry contract. Registry slots will be auctioned. If chosen in the auction, the service provider will become part of the list of MSs and must deposit some RDN.

Client Onboarding

Clients that want to request this service have to deposit an amount of RDN into the UDC in order to provide rewards to the MS. This happens during the general Raiden onboarding process, so that no additional preparation is necessary when usage of a MS is desired.

Service Discovery

All MS listen to a public Matrix room. Monitor Requests are broadcast and no specific MSs are appointed. The MSs can also publish their expected rewards in this room, which does not provide any guarantees, but increases the chance of reliable monitoring if both parties cooperate.

Monitoring Service Payment

The MS is paid after successfully submitting its client’s balance proof update. The payment is paid out from a deposit in the User Deposit Contract (UDC). Ideally, only one MS submits the latest BP to the SC to avoid unnecessary gas usage. This can be made more likely by choosing the rewarded MS based on a function of the MS’s address and the current block number. MSs which have a low f(address, block_num) would be incentivized to wait for a block number which yields a higher f for them, since they would probably lose out to another MS if they submitted the BP during the current block. Incentivizing MSs to wait in some cases greatly reduces the number of MSs submitting BPs simultaneously.

Ensuring MS Reliability

The MS has an incentive to intervene in case of a dispute, since it is only paid in that case. There are no incentives for a high level of reliability and the client knows neither how many MSs are monitoring his channel nor how reliable they are. These tradeoffs are made to favor simplicity of implementation.


The Recipient and the actual transferred amounts amount are hidden by providing a hashed balance proof (or state). This provides some sort of privacy even if it can potentially be recalculated.

Security Analysis (inspired by PISA)

State Privacy

Blinded BPs are published to the MS as part of the Monitor Request in the matrix room and then submitted to the smart contract.

Fair Exchange

Clients can freely choose the reward for the MS, so it is easy for him to choose the amount in a way that makes the exchange attractive for himself. The client can’t know if a MS started monitoring his payment channel, so he can’t use such feedback to arrive at a reward where he knows that the deal is attractive for both him and the MS. Neither can he recognize if there is no such possible reward. The MS on the other hand can freely choose to ignore requests when the reward is too low, so he will only choose requests that he deems fairly rewarded. If the MS ignores the client’s request, the client keeps his deposit and it can be used by other MSs or for later BPs. In summary, the exchange is fair for both parties, but there is a high likelihood that no exchange will happen at all.


MSs can put the clients channel deposit at risk by ignoring all client requests. But since a MS can’t force other MSs to ignore client requests, this can not be considered as framing. When only a single MS is monitoring the channel, the MS’s dispute intervention and the reward payment happen atomically inside the SC. In this case, no party can frame the other.

When multiple MSs try to settle the same dispute, only the first one doing so receives a reward, but all of them have to invest resources to monitor the channel and spend gas to interact with the SC. If you find a way to continuously front run other MSs, you can drain their resources and block their only income. However, while doing so you fulfilled the MS’s duty to settle the payment channel correctly and protect the client’s deposit. In the short run, this is an acceptable outcome for the client. In the long run, this will drive other MSs out of business and thus reduce redundancy and reliability of the overall MS ecosystem. Since all MSs try to be the first to submit a BP, it is unlikely that a single MS will continuously be the fastest, but slightly slower MSs will still not get any rewards even if they are well behaved and reliable.

If a client wants to waste the resources of MSs, he can first broadcast a BP with a high reward and keep more recent BPs to himself. When a dispute happens, he can wait for the MSs to act before submitting his latest BPs, which prevents the MSs from receiving a reward. Doing this at a large scale is expensive, since the client needs to open and close a payment channel for this at his own cost.

Recourse as a Financial Deterrent

There is no possibility of recourse which lets MSs operate without any incentive of high reliability. A client must expect MSs to ignore their requests and have no means to force a highly reliable monitoring.

Efficiency Requirements

For each channel, only the latest (as indicated by the nonce) BP has to be saved. Unless an extremely high amount of channels is being monitored, this efficiency should not be a concern for the MS. A client can use a single deposit to request an MS to monitor all his payment channels. If this causes the MS to monitor a problematically high amount of channels, he can start to ignore requests made by this client, or even drop old requests. Since there is no punishment for failing to monitor a channel, stopping to monitor is a simple way to reduce resource usage when desired, although it should not be necessary under normal circumstances.

Proposed SC Logic

  1. Client (Raiden node) will transfer tokens used as a reward to the User Deposit Contract (UDC)
  2. Whoever calls SC’s updateTransfer method MUST supply payout address as a parameter. This address is stored in the UDC. updateTransfer MAY be called multiple times, but it will only accept a balance proof newer than the previous one
  3. When calling claimReward, the reward tokens will be sent to the payout address

Appendix A: Interfaces

Broadcast Interface

Client’s request to store a balance proof will be in the usual scenario broadcasted using Matrix as a transport layer. A public chatroom will be available for anyone to join - clients will post balance proofs to the chatroom and Monitoring Services picks them up.

Web3 Interface

Monitoring Service are required to have a synced Ethereum node with an enabled JSON-RPC interface. All blockchain operations are performed using this connection.

Event Filtering

MS must filter events for each onchain channel that corresponds to the submitted balance proofs. On ChannelClosed and NonClosingBalanceProofUpdated events state the channel was closed with the Monitoring Service must call updateNonClosingBalanceProof with the respective latest balance proof provided by its client. On ChannelSettled event any state data for this channel MAY be deleted from the MS.

Appendix B: Message Format

Monitoring Services uses JSON format to exchange the data. For description of the envelope format and required fields of the message please see Transport document.

Monitor Request

Monitor Requests are messages that the Raiden client broadcasts to Monitoring Services in order to get monitoring for a channel.

A Monitor Request consists of a the following fields:

Field Name Field Type Description
balance_proof object Latest Blinded Balance Proof to be used by the monitor service
non_closing_signature string Signature of the Onchain Balance Proof by the client
reward_amount uint256 Proposed fee in RDN
reward_proof_signature string Signature of the reward proof data.

All of this fields are required. Monitoring Service MUST perform verification of these data, namely channel existence. Monitoring service SHOULD accept the message if and only if the sender of the message is same as the sender address recovered from the signature.

Example Monitor Request

  "balance_proof": {
      "token_network_address": "0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2",
      "chain_id": 1,
      "channel_identifier": 76,
      "balance_hash": "0x1c3a34a22ab087808ba772f40779b04e719080e86289c7a4ad1bd2098a3c751d",
      "nonce": 5,
      "additional_hash": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
      "signature": "0xd38c435654373983d5bdee589980853b5e7da2714d7bdcba5282ccb88ffd29210c3b1d07313aab05f7d2a514561b6796191093a9ce5726da8f1eb89bc575bc7e1b"
  "non_closing_signature": "0x77857e08793165163380d50ea780cf3798d2132a61b1d43395fc6e4a766f3c1918f8365d3bef173e0f8bb32c1f373be76369f54fb0ac7fdf91dd559e6e5865431b",
  "reward_amount": 1234,
  "reward_proof_signature": "0x12345e08793165163380d50ea780cf3798d2132a61b1d43395fc6e4a766f3c1918f8365d3bef173e0f8bb32c1f373be76369f54fb0ac7fdf91dd559e6e5864444a"

Reward Proof

ecdsa_recoverable(privkey, sha3_keccak("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n148" || channel_identifier || reward_amount || token_network_address || chain_id || nonce ))


Field Name Field Type Description
signature_prefix string \x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n
message_length string 148 = length of message = 32 + 32 + 20 + 32 + 32
channel_identifier uint256 Channel identifier inside the TokenNetwork contract
reward_amount uint256 Rewards received for updating the channel.
token_network_address address Address of the TokenNetwork contract
chain_id uint256 Chain identifier as defined in EIP155
nonce uint256 Strictly monotonic value used to order transfers. The nonce starts at 1
signature bytes Elliptic Curve 256k1 signature on the above data from participant paying the reward